UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

JOSE LUIS BELLOC,)	CASE NO. 4:08 CV 1667
Plaintiff,)	JUDGE SARA LIOI
v.)	
UNITED STATES, et al.,)	MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants.)	

On July 10, 2008, plaintiff *pro se* Jose Luis Belloc filed this *in forma pauperis* civil rights action, apparently seeking to challenge his 2004 conviction in the Western District of Texas for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Principles requiring generous construction of *pro se* pleadings are not without limits. *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. *See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. *Beaudette*, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a *pro se* plaintiff, . . . [and] would . . . transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." *Id.*

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably might suggesting plaintiff have a valid federal claim. *See*, *Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ*,, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief). Further, when a prisoner challenges "the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, . . . his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 501 (1973). Finally, absent allegations

A claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking § 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

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that criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor or that a conviction stemming from the

asserted violation of his rights was reversed, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, he

may not recover damages for his claim. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed under § 1915(e). Further, the

court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be

taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2008

HONORABLE SARA LIOI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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